The British local elections of 2019, part 3: A new north-south divide
In the context of British elections at all levels, the regional picture must be analysed properly in addition to the national picture.
No more has this been truer than the 2019 British local elections. The national picture shows a net loss of 1,330 Conservative seats, a net loss of 84 Labour seats, a net increase of 705 Liberal Democrat seats, and a net increase of 194 Green seats on BBC figures. They were indeed the worst results for the Conservatives since 1995, and in some ways worse.
However, unlike 1995, heavy Conservative losses were not nearly universal at all. And unlike in 1981 where the SDP-Liberal Alliance gains were relatively evenly distributed, there was a very uneven distribution of Liberal Democrat and Green gains across England.
In the north of England (North East, North West, and Yorkshire & The Humber) and the Midlands (both East and West) the Conservatives suffered comparatively fewer losses although they did have fewer council seats to lose north of the Wash. Their most significant strides this year were north of the Wash-in North East Derbyshire, North East Lincolnshire, and Stoke-on-Trent. All three of these were formerly Labour strongholds and once home to key areas of British industry; Stoke-on-Trent its kilns and glassworks, North East Derbyshire its coal mines, and North East Lincolnshire its fishing port. This year is the very first time the first two authorities have seen a Conservative council, and the Conservatives almost became the largest party in Stoke-on-Trent with Labour hitting a historic low of 16 seats there. They also gained Walsall but narrowly missed out on gaining Dudley, increased their holds on Redditch and North Lincolnshire, became the largest party in Darlington, and held the majority of their 2015 gains in North Warwickshire and South Derbyshire this year. Both of the latter are former Midlands coal mining areas which have since served as affordable commuter bases for nearby Midlands cities; hence they have been able to attract aspirational Conservative voters from more modest backgrounds and incomes than those in the south. They gained seats in Bolsover for the first time in decades, contributing to Labour's first ever loss of the area famous in politics for its radical MP, Dennis Skinner; on the other side of the Midlands Labour lost control of Cannock Chase with Green gains primarily being responsible in that case. The Conservatives also became the largest parties in the key cities of Carlisle and Derby even though they did not gain overall control of either and this also happened because of Labour losses than Conservative gains. They also did not lose any seats in Tamworth, once home to the Reliant factory and nor did they lose any in East Staffordshire, one of the last major brewing centres left in the United Kingdom. A large proportion of Conservative losses north of the Wash were either in genteel areas such as the Malvern Hills and Warwick or where local independents were strongly organised, such as in rural Lincolnshire. In terms of areas becoming more favourable to the Conservatives, only Bassetlaw and Telford & The Wrekin saw major losses.
By comparison, there were Conservative losses all over the south, Thanet being one of the few exceptions due to UKIP's collapse naturally benefitting the Conservatives (but Labour more so in fact). Why did this electoral divide occur?
It is fair to say in the north of England, Labour has taken former industrial areas for granted and it has paid the price for its neglect, in the same way the Conservatives did in many affluent parts of the south. Brexit fault lines played a part in the results and the wide deviations in election results, but contrary to media myths it was not the overriding factor even though political parties supporting Remain did indeed make hundreds of gains compared to losses for political parties supporting Leave. The majority of these councils last held elections in 2015, which being simultaneous with a general election where the Liberal Democrats lost 411 seats and retained control of only 4 councils (Eastbourne, Oadby & Wigston, South Lakeland and Watford) which had elections in 2015. That year the Conservatives gained 541 seats and control of 32 more councils despite UKIP holding them back. Therefore, many Conservative and Labour seats would have changed hands anyway on lower local election turnout with smaller parties less subject to a squeeze.
Demographic change, where an area's demographics change in the long-term, was also a strong factor, and one that will have lasting political consequences in British politics. Increased education levels, combined with younger people moving out to the commuter belts having been shut out of London, are naturally increasing the Liberal Democrat vote and the Green vote more so year after year. The Labour mining vote is not coming back, and neither is most of its industrial vote; as these voters die or move away middle of the road commuters dissatisfied with city life replace them. In many places in the south this has already happened; Labour finished fourth behind the Green Party in the Forest of Dean which will almost certainly never again elect a Labour council. Labour were also wiped out in Dacorum, an authority they controlled outright in 1973 and from 1995-2003; the Liberal Democrats made 15 gains from the Conservatives in Dacorum by comparison, a clear example of gentrification by university educated London commuters. Greens will take root further and further in (semi-)rural areas where old industries have long since gone. Likewise, a large proportion of Liberal Democrat gains were in areas within commuting distance of London or involved recoveries of seats they lost heavily to the Conservatives in their 2015 drubbing, such as in South Somerset and Teignbridge.
A new north-south divide has emerged, and the Conservatives are taking roots in old industrial areas which when I was born would have laughed at the prospect of electing a Conservative majority or a Conservative administration in the near future. Meanwhile former Conservative heartlands once regarded as rock-solid have been lost and in time these will prove not to be political aberrations either. The Green Party holds the balance of power in more councils than ever before and now has the chance to lead an administration outside Brighton. It is clear that the old two-party politics era is over in Britain, and that the 2017 general election was just a blip. Proportional representation is urgently needed as more and more councils fall into no overall control.
No more has this been truer than the 2019 British local elections. The national picture shows a net loss of 1,330 Conservative seats, a net loss of 84 Labour seats, a net increase of 705 Liberal Democrat seats, and a net increase of 194 Green seats on BBC figures. They were indeed the worst results for the Conservatives since 1995, and in some ways worse.
However, unlike 1995, heavy Conservative losses were not nearly universal at all. And unlike in 1981 where the SDP-Liberal Alliance gains were relatively evenly distributed, there was a very uneven distribution of Liberal Democrat and Green gains across England.
In the north of England (North East, North West, and Yorkshire & The Humber) and the Midlands (both East and West) the Conservatives suffered comparatively fewer losses although they did have fewer council seats to lose north of the Wash. Their most significant strides this year were north of the Wash-in North East Derbyshire, North East Lincolnshire, and Stoke-on-Trent. All three of these were formerly Labour strongholds and once home to key areas of British industry; Stoke-on-Trent its kilns and glassworks, North East Derbyshire its coal mines, and North East Lincolnshire its fishing port. This year is the very first time the first two authorities have seen a Conservative council, and the Conservatives almost became the largest party in Stoke-on-Trent with Labour hitting a historic low of 16 seats there. They also gained Walsall but narrowly missed out on gaining Dudley, increased their holds on Redditch and North Lincolnshire, became the largest party in Darlington, and held the majority of their 2015 gains in North Warwickshire and South Derbyshire this year. Both of the latter are former Midlands coal mining areas which have since served as affordable commuter bases for nearby Midlands cities; hence they have been able to attract aspirational Conservative voters from more modest backgrounds and incomes than those in the south. They gained seats in Bolsover for the first time in decades, contributing to Labour's first ever loss of the area famous in politics for its radical MP, Dennis Skinner; on the other side of the Midlands Labour lost control of Cannock Chase with Green gains primarily being responsible in that case. The Conservatives also became the largest parties in the key cities of Carlisle and Derby even though they did not gain overall control of either and this also happened because of Labour losses than Conservative gains. They also did not lose any seats in Tamworth, once home to the Reliant factory and nor did they lose any in East Staffordshire, one of the last major brewing centres left in the United Kingdom. A large proportion of Conservative losses north of the Wash were either in genteel areas such as the Malvern Hills and Warwick or where local independents were strongly organised, such as in rural Lincolnshire. In terms of areas becoming more favourable to the Conservatives, only Bassetlaw and Telford & The Wrekin saw major losses.
By comparison, there were Conservative losses all over the south, Thanet being one of the few exceptions due to UKIP's collapse naturally benefitting the Conservatives (but Labour more so in fact). Why did this electoral divide occur?
It is fair to say in the north of England, Labour has taken former industrial areas for granted and it has paid the price for its neglect, in the same way the Conservatives did in many affluent parts of the south. Brexit fault lines played a part in the results and the wide deviations in election results, but contrary to media myths it was not the overriding factor even though political parties supporting Remain did indeed make hundreds of gains compared to losses for political parties supporting Leave. The majority of these councils last held elections in 2015, which being simultaneous with a general election where the Liberal Democrats lost 411 seats and retained control of only 4 councils (Eastbourne, Oadby & Wigston, South Lakeland and Watford) which had elections in 2015. That year the Conservatives gained 541 seats and control of 32 more councils despite UKIP holding them back. Therefore, many Conservative and Labour seats would have changed hands anyway on lower local election turnout with smaller parties less subject to a squeeze.
Demographic change, where an area's demographics change in the long-term, was also a strong factor, and one that will have lasting political consequences in British politics. Increased education levels, combined with younger people moving out to the commuter belts having been shut out of London, are naturally increasing the Liberal Democrat vote and the Green vote more so year after year. The Labour mining vote is not coming back, and neither is most of its industrial vote; as these voters die or move away middle of the road commuters dissatisfied with city life replace them. In many places in the south this has already happened; Labour finished fourth behind the Green Party in the Forest of Dean which will almost certainly never again elect a Labour council. Labour were also wiped out in Dacorum, an authority they controlled outright in 1973 and from 1995-2003; the Liberal Democrats made 15 gains from the Conservatives in Dacorum by comparison, a clear example of gentrification by university educated London commuters. Greens will take root further and further in (semi-)rural areas where old industries have long since gone. Likewise, a large proportion of Liberal Democrat gains were in areas within commuting distance of London or involved recoveries of seats they lost heavily to the Conservatives in their 2015 drubbing, such as in South Somerset and Teignbridge.
A new north-south divide has emerged, and the Conservatives are taking roots in old industrial areas which when I was born would have laughed at the prospect of electing a Conservative majority or a Conservative administration in the near future. Meanwhile former Conservative heartlands once regarded as rock-solid have been lost and in time these will prove not to be political aberrations either. The Green Party holds the balance of power in more councils than ever before and now has the chance to lead an administration outside Brighton. It is clear that the old two-party politics era is over in Britain, and that the 2017 general election was just a blip. Proportional representation is urgently needed as more and more councils fall into no overall control.
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