All change for Moldova in 2021 snap election

The snap election in Moldova which took place last Sunday brought one of the most dramatic political changes for a country in the Balkans which is also one of Europe's poorest, and one of a minority of European countries who are not part of the European Union.

The pro-European liberal Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) managed to win an impressive 63 seats out of 101, and with 52.8% of the vote, the first time a non-communist and non-socialist party in Moldova has been able to achieve this feat, which is virtually impossible in most democracies using only list-PR and no other method for electing MPs. The key reason for their surge during this snap election was the popularity of Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who claimed the result was "today and end to the reign of thieves in Moldova". PAS' 

The outgoing governmental parties, who had formed the Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists Alliance, meanwhile endured a spectacular defeat. They won only 32 seats, just over half that achieved by PAS, and with only 27.17% of the vote, compared to a combined total of 34.9% for the Socialist and Communist Parties of Moldova in 2019 (the Socialists polled 31.15%, the Communists 3.75%). Key reasons for their defeat were the increasing exasperation of the Moldovan electorate with a constitutional crisis that resulted in several changes of government in the last two years and poor handling of the coronavirus pandemic. The Party of Socialists' decision to ally with the Communists, who under Vladimir Voronin acted more like a standard Eastern European centrist and clientelist party, did not help their case either, except in the autonomous regions of Gaugazia and Transnistria, the latter of which considers itself independent of Moldova even though the Republic of Moldova merely considers it an autonomous region of Moldova (as does the rest of the world apart from three unrecognised breakaway states nearby, namely Abkhazia, Artsakh and South Ossetia) with special rights, where they polled more than twice and nearly thrice their national vote share, and the northwestern counties which also have the largest Ukrainian populations in Moldova. Their support overall was strongest in counties some distance from the Moldovan capital of Chisinau (Kishniev) where PAS polled nearly twice the vote of the Electoral Bloc of Socialists and Communists.

The Sor Party, which claims to be big tent but is in reality closer to the hardline Eurosceptic Danish People's Party and the Finns Party in most respects, was the only other party to win seats in the Moldovan Parliament, although even then they lost a seat bringing them down to 6, and only just passed the 5% threshold (for single parties; it is 7% for alliances of two or more parties) with 5.74% of the vote. Given the relative lack of freedom in Moldova in practice by European standards, it is understandable that, especially with the COVID-19 pandemic still in session, that an authoritarian party would not be popular in Moldova at present even with rural voters (the two districts where Sor polled highest have low population densities and are quite far from Chisinau) and furthermore PAS absorbed some of their more moderate voters, further proof that they are not a "big tent" party.

Two parties which had done well in 2019 were wiped out in this election, falling well below the 5% threshold. The junior partner of the 2019 coalition, the Dignity & Truth Party, polled a mere 2.33% and lost all 11 seats partly because its platform was too similar to that of the rising PAS, and because of the golden rule of junior coalition partners (almost always) coming off worse. The Democratic Party of Moldova, which had early on in the previous Moldovan parliament suffered a split involving half its deputies defecting to form the Pro Moldova party (which did not stand despite having 7 MPs before the snap election was announced), fared even worse, polling 1.81% and losing all 30 seats. Another notable failure is that of the electoral alliance of Renato Usatii, who in the 2020 presidential election of Moldova finished a creditable third to Maia Sandu and Igor Dodon, which polled just 4.1%, despite having considerable support in Moldova's second city, Balti (pronounced bel-ti), where it finished second, and this further demonstrates the waning influence of Russia on Moldova.

Of the other parties, the failure of the Democracy at Home Party, a conservative populist party which supports the idea of reunification of Moldova and Romania, a subject a controversy for decades, is the most notable; it only polled 1.45%. A majority of Moldovans are opposed to the idea of such a union but a clear majority of Romanians support such unification; economic disparities between Moldova and Romania are the primary reason for Moldovan opposition since polls found that Moldovans would be more supportive if economic equality was directly induced alongside such a reunification, although a second key problem for Moldovans is that the Romanian constitution, unlike the Moldovan constitution, does not allow regional self-autonomy in the way Gaugazia and Transnistria currently have. Green parties still face a considerable struggle in eastern and southeastern Europe and once again the Ecologist Green Party of Moldova came nowhere near the threshold for representation. The wooden spoon went to the New Party, who polled 197 votes-the lowest ever for any political party in modern Moldovan history.

As with most southeastern European countries, election turnout is poor in Moldova, and this election was no exception with a turnout of just 48.4%, even with clear political change occurring in Moldova. Igor Grosu, former President of the Moldovan Parliament (equivalent to Speaker of the House of Commons) is clearly set to become Prime Minister of Moldova, and substantial changes in Moldova can be expected, including potentially the start of accession of Moldova to the European Union.