The 112 constituencies swinging away from Brexit-why are they swinging in Remain's direction?

It has been reported that as many as 112 constituencies which are estimated to have voted Leave, often by narrow margins, at the 2016 British EU membership referendum would now vote Remain if a referendum on the final deal was held before 29 March 2019, and this would certainly be enough to swing the result decisively, if narrowly, in Remain's favour. This crucially means a majority of constituencies would now vote in favour of remaining the EU-341 to 309.

But why these 112, you may be asking?

A careful look at the 112 in question (contained in this list): https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/brexit-seats-switch-remain-list-13070561 shows that only 98 would swing significantly; the margin which Leave won the referendum by was after all 3.8%. Of the 32 that would according to the research swing by 10 points or more to give a "Remain" result in a hypothetical second referendum, only one, Southampton Itchen, elected a Conservative MP in 2017 (Royston Smith, by 31 votes); the majority of them are safely Labour but are also constituencies where UKIP's vote was at least the UK average of 12.5% in 2015, and all are urban constituencies with notable areas of considerable deprivation and poverty. It is no surprise that Liverpool Walton topped this list: it uniformly has unemployment and/or long-term sickness considerably higher than the national average and it is the safest Labour constituency in the country (it delivered the highest Labour vote in 2017 with 85.7%). Knowsley, second on the list of 112, is a directly comparable example: out of its current (pre-boundary changes in Knowsley borough which took place in 2016) wards, 6 (according to 2011 census figures based on the pre-2016 wards) are in the top 100 wards for people with no qualifications, 2 are in the top 100 wards for unemployment and as many as 6 are in the top 100 for people classifying themselves as long-term sick or disabled; its Labour majority is nearly as high as Liverpool Walton's. Traditional values are strong in Knowsley as well: 12 of its 15 old wards are in the top 100 for people identifying as Christian in terms of religion. A majority of high-swinging constituencies in this analysis also have at least 2 wards (often more) which in the 2011 census ranked in the top decile for few or no qualifications and routine occupations/long-term unemployment in terms of socio-economic class. Many of these 32 also register turnouts noticeably lower than average at general election time on a regular basis. At least a few other constituencies with a large working class vote have also swung strongly away from Brexit, but have not appeared in the list because the swings were not large enough to push them into the Remain column as far as the report was concerned; Middlesbrough is among this list

As I said in my 2016 analysis, a large proportion of the Leave vote came from traditional working class voters who felt alienated by the European Union (and often by borders they felt were too open) and what they perceived as an overly liberal, out of touch elite who had failed to help them or listen to their concerns despite EU funding being marked to help poorer areas of the United Kingdom. These types of Brexit voters were particularly drawn from areas which had lost traditional industries like shipbuilding and fishing and felt the EU was directly responsible for the failure of such industries to recover in those areas, key examples being Great Grimsby and Hartlepool.

Many of these former Leave voters, who are disproportionately represented in the majority of that list of 112, now realise that leaving the European Union would, far from ameliorating their situation, make their socio-economic prospects worse than ever before in all respects, and they are also tired of the Brexit negotiations going nowhere and leading Britain in a downward spiral; these areas will be hit worst in the aftermath of a no-deal Brexit scenario, unlikely as that is to happen, or a Brexit scenario where Britain obtains a subpar deal. It is also worth noting that among the constituencies with considerable swings to Remain (1-3% does not count as considerable e.g. with reference to East Devon at the bottom of the list, just so we are clear), none of them are rural constituencies.






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