My analysis of the 2022 United Kingdom local elections, part 1: England: A new era?

The 2022 United Kingdom local elections, particularly in Greater London but also elsewhere in England, in many ways further enforce a new political era in the United Kingdom. 

The Conservatives' losses were not as high as many media outlets predicted, but it is important to remember that they were defending significantly fewer wards than in 2019, especially with the creation of the new unitary authorities of Cumberland, North Yorkshire, Somerset, and Westmorland & Furness which replace the respective county councils and districts of those areas from next year. They lost a total of 336 seats overall notionally (there were extensive boundary changes in many London boroughs, as well as some metropolitan boroughs including St Helens), including 84 net losses in Greater London alone even accounting for the gains they made in Harrow, the only council they gained overall control of this year. Retaining control of Newcastle-under-Lyme was their only other crumb of comfort. In Greater London they lost more than half the seats they were defending in Camden, Ealing, Merton and Redbridge, areas where they were already in retreat, as well as their last council seat in Lambeth  Other increasingly progressive areas that were once Conservative bastions repudiated them heavily, including Tunbridge Wells where they are no longer even the largest party, Wokingham which they held control of even in the 1990s, and Somerset (which replaces Somerset CC and the four Somerset districts from next year), where they held control of the county council since 2009. Their losses in North Hertfordshire where I was the Green Party candidate in Letchworth South West (one of many middle-class urban wards the Conservatives lost this year, in this case to the Liberal Democrats) illustrate the increasing urban/rural divide in Conservative fortunes both in the short and long term: of the 4 (out of 8 they were defending) wards the Conservatives held this year in that district, only 1 (Royston Palace) was in an urban ward; the other three were in rural wards comprising one or more villages. Similar patterns were seen in many other Home Counties districts such as Tandridge. Even wealthier (ex)Conservative voters are increasingly tired with the scandals that the Conservatives as a whole are increasingly embroiled in, and the cost-of-living crisis affects even the affluent middle classes to some extent, although it bites hardest in Greater London at present where the cost of living was already high pre-coronavirus pandemic. In particular, the creation of new authorities in Cumbria, North Yorkshire, and Somerset was not greeted well by voters; not only did the Conservatives suffer substantial seat losses in those areas (counting Cumberland and Westmorland & Furness as Cumbria) but also turnout was noticeably lower than expected.

Whilst Labour met many of its expectations for this year's elections, convincingly winning control of Barnet, Wandsworth, and for the very first time, Westminster, they found themselves knocked back where either demographic change was turning against them long-term (e.g. Amber Valley, Harlow, Newcastle-under-Lyme), or where local circumstances were strongly against Labour (notably Tower Hamlets, where they lost both the mayoralty and council to Lutfur Rahman and the Aspire Party, and Croydon, where the inaugural mayoral election was narrowly won by the Conservatives and where they lost overall control of the council as well, partly related to the council being declared bankrupt during the last term), despite often benefitting from the Conservatives' woes overall. Furthermore, in the final days of the campaign, allegations about Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer taking part in office visits to Durham whilst lockdown restrictions preventing nonessential travel were in place surfaced, which tarnished his reputation in poorer councils in particular; Sir Keir later stated that he would resign if given a lockdown fine similar to one recently handed down to Boris Johnson. In the south of England, gentrification of traditionally Conservative areas due to middle-class Labour voters being priced out of London (and such areas as Brighton & Hove and Bristol for that matter) is increasing Labour prospects in areas where they had no significant prospects before, helping them gain control of Worthing council for the very first time. Back in 2013, when I started this blog, Labour did not have a single councillor in Worthing, which is increasingly being populated by young professionals unable to afford housing in Brighton & Hove. Shoreham (covered by the Adur district) is also experiencing this to a lesser extent.

The Liberal Democrats continued to build on their 2019 and 2021 gains, almost wiping out the Conservatives in St Albans, Kingston-upon-Thames and Richmond-upon-Thames (Conservative seat totals in these boroughs: 4, 3, and 1 respectively), as well as the Wimbledon part of Merton (i.e. the area currently comprising the Wimbledon parliamentary constituency), and holding Sutton against all expectations even with the troubles the administration had been experiencing, as sometimes reported in Private Eye inter alia. Although Gosport, a relatively poor coastal town with an ageing population, sounds like a surprise gain for them, voters priced out of Fareham and other towns along the Solent yet not willing to live in Portsmouth (which has the highest population density in the UK, with all the issues this entails) are moving into Gosport even though it notably lacks a railway station (and is one of the largest towns in Europe without one). Another surprise for them was their gain of Hull, with their otherwise low total of 3 gains being enough to gain control, again due to the increasingly centrist stance of Keir Starmer alienating poorer Labour voters north of the Wash; however, they lost considerable ground against Labour in London, especially in the boroughs of Haringey and Southwark where they have been the only significant challengers  to Labour for many years, although arguably in these areas many would-be Liberal Democrat voters are moving out of these boroughs to the Home Counties. Metropolitan professionals are still participating in the "work from home" exodus which impacts significantly on areas like these.

The Green Party managed to make more net gains in England than Labour did, much to the surprise of everyone, even some environmental activists. Not only did they make a net gain of 63 seats, notionally more than doubling the seats they won in 2018, they also won representation for the first time in Calderdale, Cheltenham, Coventry, Croydon, Maidstone, Newham, Plymouth, Three Rivers, and Tower Hamlets, as well as regaining representation in Hackney, and even the Liberal Democrats could not always escape the Green surge (their first seats in Cheltenham and Three Rivers were gains from the Liberal Democrats) despite Green votes being tactically squeezed in many wards the Liberal Democrats gained this year (including the aforementioned example of Letchworth South West) whereas Green votes held firmer in Labour-Conservative marginals overall. One notable setback for the Greens amidst all these gains was in Lambeth, where despite their hard campaigning against gentrification of council estates they lost 3 seats, holding only 2 of the seats in Streatham St Leonard's ward within Lambeth. Labour's better than expected performance in Greater London also stymied hopes of gaining the other 2 seats of Highgate ward, Camden, and limited Green gains in Hackney to just 2 seats, both in split wards where they were less than 100 votes short of winning in 2018 (Dalston and Hackney Downs).

Even with so many Conservative losses and many Liberal Democrat and Green gains, in addition to a modest number of Labour gains overall, British local politics is firmly in a new era where the divide is no longer between north and south or necessarily even rich and poor (to some extent; ultra-rich areas in Greater London held out for the Conservatives as usual) but city, town, and country, public sector-dominated and private sector-dominated, and between highly academic and not so academic in terms of educational attainment. The Conservatives may yet continue to control Amber Valley and Harlow councils even if their poll ratings drop below the lows seen in the worst years of Sir John Major's tenure as PM, and conversely are unlikely to regain control of St Albans or Worthing councils anytime soon, and further gentrification of metropolitan areas is now generally more beneficial to the Liberal Democrats or Labour than the Conservatives.

If you are wondering why I have not talked about national vote shares in this analysis, this is because they are relevant to general elections and current opinion polling only; they cannot be properly extrapolated to fit or predict local election results as a whole due to increasing long-term political divergence between the various districts and boroughs, not to mention a gradual reduction in traditional "Lab-Con/Con-Lab" swing voters; national opinion polling can only predict the outcome of a handful of councils where there are still significant numbers of voters of this type e.g. Southampton (which was indeed gained by Labour as predicted).